The Etymological Meanings of “‘Ilm” & “Fiqh” in Relation to “Shari’ah” & “Diyn”

بِسۡمِ ٱللهِ ٱلرَّحۡمَـٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ 

The following is adapted from a paper by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ghafur ‘Abd ar-Rahim.  One of the factors which stand against change and reform of Islamic law is the current rigid conceptualisation of some basic terms.  The development of fiqh led to the construing of the terms “diyn”, “islam”, and “shari’ah” in concrete fiqhi terms.  The underlying ethical principles which the concrete fiqhi values embodied became insignificant or of secondary importance.  Consciously or not, this in turn led to the equation of forms and principles, thereby making change extremely difficult.  Any proposed change came to be conceived as undermining the principles themselves embodied in the fiqhi forms. 

The involvement of human intelligence was in the form of ‘ilm, learning; and fiqh, understanding.  Learning, at first referred to as qira’ah, reading, involved reading, understanding, and learning the  Qur’an.  It also meant knowing Islam in general and its essentials, like ritual prayer, payment of zakat, fasting in Ramadhan, and haj.  The Prophet (s.a.w.) sent Companions to the newly converted tribes to read to them the Qur’an, and to instruct them in the essentials, shara’i of Islam.  Later, the term, “qira’ah” was replaced by “‘ilm”, and meant knowledge of the Qur’an and Islam in general.  This is seen in Sayyidina Abu ‘Abd ar-Rahman ‘Abdullah ibn Mas’ud’s (r.a.) tribute to Sayyidina Abu Hafsw ‘Umar ibn al-Khaththab al-Faruq (r.a.), on the latter’s passong.  Sayyidina ibn Mas’ud (r.a.) said that with the death of Sayyidina ‘Umar (r.a.), nine-tenths of ‘ilm had gone away with him.  As Sayyidina ‘Umar (r.a.) had a deep and broad understanding of Islam, reflected in the important legislation he introduced, Sayyidina ibn Mas’ud (r.a.) referred to Sayyidina ‘Umar’s (r.a.) general understanding of Islam rather that to a particular branch  of knowledge. 

When the movement to collect ahadits began towards the end of the first century, the term “‘ilm” came generally to be used in the sense of the knowledge of the tradition, that is, ahadits and atsar, the former referring to statements of the Prophet (s.a.w.), and the latter to that of Companions and Followers.  Works on Tradition began to appear in the second and third centuries after hijrah; Imam ‘Abd ar-Razzaq ibn Hammam asw-Swan’ani’s (r.a.) al-Muswannaf, and Imam Abu Bakr ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abu Shaybah’s (r.a.) al-Muswannaf fi al-Ahadits wa al-Atsar are examples of such works.  Thus, learning of the Qur’an and the teachings of islam resulted in producing a vast body of authoritative knowledge.  This body of knowledge in addition to the Qur’an came to be referred to as ‘ilm. 

Like ‘ilm, the term, “fiqh”, which literally meant deep understanding, initially referred to a process, namely, a deep understanding of the Qur’an and Islam.  The Prophet (s.a.w.) is reported to have invoked God to bestow upon Sayyidina ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas (r.a.) the understanding of diyn, by bestowing on him the skill of interpreting the Qur’an: “Allahumma faqihhu fi ad-din wa ‘allimhu at-ta’wil”.   The Companions who excelled in the understanding of the Qur’an and the teachings of Islam, were known as “fuqaha’”.  Shaykh Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Sa’d (r.a.) identified Sayyidina ‘Umar (r.a.), Sayyidina ‘Ali ibn Abu Thalib (k.w.), Sayyidina ibn Mas’ud (r.a.), Sayyidina Zayd ibn Harits (r.a.), Sayyidina Abu Mundzir Ubay ibn Ka’b (r.a.), and Sayyidina Abu Musa ‘Abdullah ibn Qays al-Ash’ari (r.a.) as fuqaha’, from among Companions who used to give fatawa, legal opinions. on various issues. 

Similarly the contrast between ahadits and fiqh during the late first and early second centuries after hijrah also highlights fiqh as a process for knowing the shari’ah.  Shaykh ibn Sa’d (r.a.) stated that Imam Abu Hanifah Nu’man ibn Tsabit (r.a.)was “weak” in ahadits, but was a “man of opinion”, that is, a man of fiqh.  This does not necessarily indicate that Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.) was unaware of the existence of certain Ahadits.  Rather it seems to point to his independent attitude in dealing with  Ahadits.  He did not base his rulings on many issues on the face value of a ahadits.  Imam ibn Abu Shaybah (r.a.) listed a number of these rulings in which Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.) went against the apparent ruling of the ahadits under the title, “This is what Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.) ruled against the ahadits which came from the Prophet (s.a.w.) ...”.  Among these, for example, is Imam Abu Hanifah’s (r.a.) ruling that the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) clan and their clients are eligible to benefit from zakat funds in spite of ahadits which contradicted this ruling.  That Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.) went against the apparent ruling of the ahadits indicates that he was aware of the ahadits. 

There is another indication that “weak” in ahadits does not mean one was unaware of its existence.  Imam Abu Yusuf Ya’qub ibn Ibrahim al-Answari (r.a.), although he excelled in ahadits, is reported to have rejected accepting it at face value after he had gained fiqh at the hands of Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.).  This seems to indicate that Imam Abu Yusuf (r.a.), although he had utilised ahadits at an early stage at its face value, did not do so at after having studied under Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.) and having gained a deep understanding of the ahadits. 

Fiqh, as in the case of ‘ilm, produced a body of religious knowledge.  This body of knowledge, like the rulings of Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.), mentioned in Muswannaf ibn Abu Shaybah, came to be referred to as fiqh.  Thus, fiqh was transformed from a process of understanding the Qur’an and sunnah, and deriving practical rules from them to something more substantial.  Around the middle of second century after hijrah, works devoted to fiqh appeared.  The Muwaththa’ of Imam Abu ‘Abdullah Malik ibn Anas (r.a.), although strictly speaking representing the period when fiqh was yet intermingled with ahadits, is the first in the list of early available literature on fiqh.  During this early period, which extended to the middle of the second century after hijrah, fiqh was not restricted to law; it also included others fields of knowledge such as theology, morals and Sufism.  This is seen in Muwaththa’, which has chapters on pre-destination and good characters.  Imam Abu Hanifah’s (r.a.) Fiqh al-Akbar also reflected that in this early period fiqh, including dogma and theology.  The major issues he deals with in  this book include the meaning of iman, and its relation to sin; the issue of whether the first four Caliphs were rightly raised to their office; and whether the Companions lived up to Islam or not. 

It is important to note that the religious knowledge produced by learning and fiqh was not known as the knowledge of shari’ah in this early period.  In fact, as many have observed, the term “shari’ah” rarely occurs in the literature of the early period; only its plural “shara’i”  occurs referring to the essentials of Islam.  The ensemble of religious knowledge during the early period was known as the knowledge of diyn or islam.  Expressions like “understanding the diyn” and “learning islam” were common during this period.  The Prophet (s.a.w.) as well as the Companions sent deputies to teach islam: Sayyidina Mu’adz (r.a.), as already mentioned, was the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) emissary to Yemen; Sayyidina ‘Umar (r.a.) send Sayyidina ‘Imran ibn Husayn al-Khuza’i (r.a.) to Baswrah to teach diyn.  Located in the early period of religious knowledge, references to the terms “diyn” and “islam”, instead of “shari’ah”, are significant.  This highlights the attitude of the believer towards the centrality of moral responsibility inherent in the concept of shari’ah, and the consciousness of the believer in this responsibility.  Shari’ah reminds that God Ordained a way that, as it was not always given in specific terms, the believer has to search for.  Diyn and islam brings to mind the believer’s struggle to find that way and his attempt to relate to God, and liven his moral consciousness in order to live righteously. 

That the idea of moral responsibility was central in the early period is also seen in the early conceptualisation of fiqh.  Among its earliest definitions is that of Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.). He defined fiqh as “ma’arifat an-nafs ma laha wa ma ‘alayha”, “the soul’s cognisance of its rights and obligations”.  Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.), in his definition of fiqh, did not seem to refer to rights and obligations.  “Ma laha wa ma ‘alayha” in his statement refers to “what stands in favour of the soul” and “what stands against it” respectively.  The expression recalls the Qur’anic verse: 

سُوۡرَةُ البَقَرَة

لَا يُكَلِّفُ ٱللَّهُ نَفۡسًا إِلَّا وُسۡعَهَا‌ۚ لَهَا مَا كَسَبَتۡ وَعَلَيۡہَا مَا ٱكۡتَسَبَتۡ‌ۗ رَبَّنَا لَا تُؤَاخِذۡنَآ إِن نَّسِينَآ أَوۡ أَخۡطَأۡنَا‌ۚ رَبَّنَا وَلَا تَحۡمِلۡ عَلَيۡنَآ إِصۡرً۬ا كَمَا حَمَلۡتَهُ ۥ عَلَى ٱلَّذِينَ مِن قَبۡلِنَا‌ۚ رَبَّنَا وَلَا تُحَمِّلۡنَا مَا لَا طَاقَةَ لَنَا بِهِۦ‌ۖ وَٱعۡفُ عَنَّا وَٱغۡفِرۡ لَنَا وَٱرۡحَمۡنَآ‌ۚ أَنتَ مَوۡلَٮٰنَا فَٱنصُرۡنَا عَلَى ٱلۡقَوۡمِ ٱلۡڪَـٰفِرِينَ (٢٨٦) 

On no soul does Allah place a burden greater than it can bear.  It gets every good that it earns and it suffers every ill that it earns. … (Surah al-Baqarah:286) 

Thus, Imam Abu Hanifah’s (r.a.) definition of fiqh as “ma’arifat an-nafs ma laha wa ma ‘alayha” would mean “the soul's cognisance of what stands in its favour and what stands against it.”  This is supported by the definition of fiqh  given by some of the followers of Imam Abu Hanifah (r.a.).  For instance, the Hanafi jurist, Imam ‘Ala ad-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas’ud al-Kasani’s (r.a.), defined fiqh as the knowledge of the permitted things and the forbidden things.  Here, Imam al-Kasani (r.a.) replaced, “ma laha wa ma ‘alayha”, with “al-halal wa al-haram”. 

When fiqh and other Islamic disciplines such as theology and Sufism developed, fiqh became restricted to law.  With this development, all these were incorporated in the concept of shari’ah, which included haqiqah, the spiritual truth of the mystic; ‘aql, the rational truth of the philosopher and the theologian; and the law.  Shaykh Yusuf ibn ‘Abdullah al-Qaradawi, a contemporary Muslim scholar and jurist, defined shari’ah as the “Injunctions which God had Ordained through any of his Prophets ... to be accepted and acted upon accordingly so that they may attain happiness here, and in Hereafter”.  He defined fiqh as “the science which deals with the deduction of legal injunctions of practical value from their general premises”.  He differentiated shari’ah from fiqh in that the former is more general, since it contains laws related to beliefs, morals and practicalities; whereas fiqh is more restrictive and deals with the practical aspects.  It must be noted that although fiqh was a derivative knowledge, after this process was completed giving fiqh  definite content in the second and third centuries, it came to be generally used interchangeably with shari’ah.  Thus, fiqh came to represent the Will of God, the Divinely-Ordained Way.  As Dr. Noel James Coulson stated, the shari’ah, having once achieved perfection of expression, that is, as developed in fiqh, was in practice static and immutable.  Floating above Muslim society as a disembodied soul, freed from the currents and vicissitudes of time, it represented the eternally valid ideal towards which society must aspire. 

With the development of fiqh, the moral responsibility which had been at the forefront receded to the background.  It was all important to follow the shari’ah, and the believer need not delve into its aims and objectives. 

This section has examined the meanings of three important terms, “diyn”, “islam”, and “shari’ah”.  The term, “diyn”, was widely used in the pre-Islamic pagan period.  In its literal usage, it meant primarily “obedience”.  In the pre-Islamic context of tribal war, this meaning was associated with subjugation and humiliation.  “Diyn”, also was used in the same context to mean “force” and “requital”.  Beside these, “diyn” was also used meaning “habit”.  Other verb forms and corresponding nouns, such as “dayyana”, and “dayyan”, were derived from the root, “diyn”.   This shows that the term, “diyn”, was well established in the pre-Islamic Arabic vocabulary.  As a technical term, “diyn”, referred to the pre-Islamic religious tradition of pagan Arabia.  This included idol-worship, sacrifices and the haj rite. 

The Qur’an Used the term, “diyn”, meaning, “judgement”, to denote a Reckoning by God of one’s actions, followed by Reward or Punishment in the Hereafter.  This implied that one would have to obey God if he were to be successful in the Reckoning.  It also implied that a person obeys God by doing what is right, and keeping away from what is wrong.  The Qur’an Elaborated on obedience to God in three stages.  In the first stage, the term, “diyn”, is used to mean worship.  Here, the Qur’an Presented two different and opposing conceptions of worship: the worship of the pagan Makkans, and that of the Prophet (s.a.w.).  The former meant their worship of idol-gods and their values such as the pursuit of wealth and worldly enjoyment to the exclusion of all other values.  The latter meant the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) worship of God and the ethical values related to this worship.  In the second stage, the term, “diyn”, Continues to be associated with worship, with the emphasis that God Alone should be worshipped.  Here, the Qur’an invites the pagan Makkans to accept its idea of worship mentioned in the first stage.  In the third and final stage, the Qur’an Uses the term, “diyn”, referring to acts of worship.  These acts included mental acts, such as beliefs, and physical acts, such as swalah, zakat, penal and dietary laws, and haj.  By Prescribing acts of worship, the Qur’an Gives a concrete sense to “diyn”, denoting obedience to God.  It indicated that it is through these acts that a person obeys God.  It also indicated that they were the means to an end.  They served to keep alive the idea of God and to help achieve some ethical goals.  Obedience was rendered to God through righteousness; not the mere performance of the acts of worship but reaching for their ethical ends. 

In the above discussion regarding the term, “islam”, it was shown that the Qur’an Used these terms to denote righteousness or a righteous person.  The previous revelations sought to teach this same righteousness, and it is in this religious sense, that the pre-Muhammadan prophets and other religious figures mentioned in the Qur’an were said to be muslimin, and have propagated islam.  The antonyms, kufr, jurm, ifsad, qasith, and jahiliyyah, all denoted unrighteous or wrongful acts, indicating that the term, “islam” denoted the opposite, that is, righteous acts.  The synonyms, Hanafiyyah, tazakki, and asw-swirath al-mustaqim, all denoted righteousness indicating that the term, “islam”, too denoted the same.  This meaning of the term islam  was also seen in the early definitions of the term.  For instance, Imam ath-Thabari (r.a.) defined islam as submission to God through good deeds. 

As for the term, “shari’ah”, it referred to the way Ordained by God to be followed and  comprised of God’s Commands and prohibitions.  Shari’ah is a comprehensive concept and included beliefs and practice permeating the private as well as the social spheres.  The primary sources of the shari’ah are the Qur’an and sunnah.  As these sources did not suffice, human intelligence in the form of ‘ilm and fiqh, were involved in elaborating the shari’ah.  This involvement produced additional religious knowledge.  In the initial stages, the ensemble of this knowledge, together with that of the Qur’an and sunnah, were referred to as diyn or islam, and not shari’ah.  This is significant in that the moral element embedded in the shari’ah was given primacy.  This was supported by the fact that fiqh, which later became the legal aspect of shari’ah, was understood as the knowledge of what stood in or against one’s favour, that is the knowledge of halal and haram.  After the development of other disciplines such as theology and Sufism, these two, together with fiqh, were known as shari’ah.  With the development of fiqh, the moral significance receded to the background, to be replaced by stress on following particular formulations.