The Maturidi School in Brief

بِسۡمِ ٱللهِ ٱلرَّحۡمَـٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ

The Maturidiyyah school is an Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah sect founded by Imam Abu Manswur Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Maturidi (r.a.), holding many positions in common with the Ash’ariyyah but differing from them on others.  Much like the Ash’ariyyah approach to Qur’anic verses that could yield an anthropomorphic concept of Allah (s.w.t.), they affirmed His Transcendence while understanding these expressions by the conventional figurative meanings they had garnered in Arabic, not through some sort of speculative rational interpretation.  The Maturidiyyah recognised that the moral quality of certain works can be rationally apprehended, just as there are others whose moral quality cannot be understood except through revelation.  But in every case, they hold that humans are not obliged to do good and refrain from evil until they encounter Revelation.  They agree with the Ash’ariyyah that human acts are the result of Divine Creation and human acquisition, but, against the Ash’ariyyah hold that acquisition is not merely conjoined with action but in fact is its haqiqiyyah, very reality.  Maturidiyyah hold that those who commit enormities will not abide in Hellfire, even if they died without repenting. 

Imam al-Maturidi (r.a.) said, “The truth about believing, habitual sinners is that their case is relegated to Allah (s.w.t.), for Him to Forgive them if He so Chooses from His Bounty and Goodness and Mercy, or to Punish them to the extent of their sins, if He so Chooses.  They will not abide in the Fire.  People of faith are between hope and fear.” 

Against the Mu’taziliyyah rationalising interpretation of Divine Acts, Imam al-Maturidi (r.a.) said, “His Acts obey an underlying wisdom because He is the Wise; He Wills Wisdom by them because He Intends them, not because He is compelled to act in a certain manner.  He is not bound, but rather has Free Volition and Will.” 

The Maturidiyyah have the soundest solution to the issue of the scope of reason in discerning the ethical status of actions, in that they develop a variegated approach.  However, they do not clarify the nature of these acts in their two types such that one might say that the acts whose moral status does not admit rational investigation are abstracted from their particular conditions, while those whose moral quality is discernible are circumscribed in relation to their time and place.